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on Article 47 may also be instructive. An argument can be made more
generally that, as the BR is intended to facilitate the enforcement of
judgments, all provisional and protective measures made under the
regime should be limited to assets in the state which might be the
subject of enforcement proceedings. Accordingly, whilst some rather
discouraging hints might be taken from the general approach of the
Court of Appeal, we still have no answer to the fundamental question
and in principle we will not have until a further reference is made to
the ECJ.
LOUISE MERRETT
REPAIRS, REFUSALS AND REJECTIONS
IN J & H Ritchie Ltd. v. Lloyd Ltd. [2007] UKHL 9, [2007] 1 W. L. R.
670, the House of Lords was required to solve a problem stemming
from section 35 (6) (a) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, by providing
limited guidance on the question whether a buyer is bound to accept
goods alleged to have been repaired. The subsection provides that the
buyer of goods is not deemed to have accepted goods merely because
he asks for, or agrees to, their repair by or under an agreement with
the seller. However, the statutory provisions provide no guidance with
respect to the continued availability of a right to reject if the buyer
agrees to repairs; nor do they provide when, in relation to the stage of
repair, the right to reject will be available.
In J & H Ritchie, the appellants purchased agricultural equipment
from the respondents. On the first day of its use the machine emitted a
noticeable vibration; however, the absence of a defect on visual
inspection meant the machine was used in this condition for a further
two days. The defective harrow was identified and removed to the
respondents’ premises for an inspection, which revealed missing
bearings, the absence of which amounted to a major defect. The
respondents fitted the missing bearings, and informed the appellants
that the harrow was repaired and ready for collection. Mr Ritchie, one
of the appellants’ directors, attempted, not unreasonably, to ascertain
what had been wrong with the harrow initially. The respondents’
employees refused to say, merely saying that the harrow was now of
‘‘factory gate specification’’. However, Mr Ritchie learned informally
that the cause of the fault was the missing bearings, which were
omitted on manufacture. Therefore, concerned about the potential
wider damage to the machine, Mr Ritchie intimated to the respondents
that he was rejecting the equipment as a result of their refusal to
explain the fault.
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The majority in the Inner House of the Court of Session had held
that Ritchie could have rejected the equipment when first delivered, as
not conforming to the contract. The effect of the repair was to remedy
that breach, therefore removing Ritchie’s right to reject the goods and
rescind the contract (2005 1 S.C. 155). In allowing the appeal, the
House of Lords proceeded on an entirely different basis from the lower
courts. Instead of considering the chronological implications of s 35(6)
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the appellate committee favoured the
implication of a term that the respondents were under a duty to
disclose, on demand, the nature of the defect in the equipment that it
had been required to repair.
Lord Hope noted that, while the legislature identified that a buyer
should not be assumed to accept goods by virtue of agreeing to their
repair, the statute is silent with regard to what should happen after the
parties agree to investigate a possible repair (at [13]). The situation fell
to be regulated by an implied term, and not by reference to the
doctrine of personal bar (broadly equivalent to estoppel) as suggested
in the Court of Session, by Lord Marnoch (dissenting). The term to be
implied into the contract of sale in this case (at [15]), was one by which
the respondents were obliged to provide the appellants with
information about the repair of the equipment. The failure of the
respondents to accede to Mr Ritchie’s requests for information placed
them in breach of this implied term, and therefore the appellants were
entitled to reject the equipment.
Lord Rodger’s approach was conceptually different from that of
Lord Hope, though with a similar result. The removal of the
equipment for inspection and repair constituted a separate ‘‘inspection
and repair agreement’’ (at [32]). This must have contained the implied
term that while the respondents performed under that agreement, the
appellants should not rescind the contract of sale (at [34]). The crux of
the matter was whether this agreement also contained an obligation
upon the respondents to inform Mr Ritchie of the problem with the
harrow. Lord Rodger held that such a term was implied in accordance
with the business efficacy test, based on the following factors: the
harrow belonged to the appellants, thus entitling them to enquire as to
the result of the inspection; as the respondents had originally supplied
the defective equipment they were obliged to tell Mr Ritchie what they
had discovered, and, finally, refusal to disclose undermined the
appellants’ ‘‘trust and confidence’’ in the respondents’ performance of
the contract (at [37]). This is a significant, if somewhat surprising, turn
of phrase. The implied term of ‘‘trust and confidence’’ is a dynamic
recent development in employment law (Malik v. Bank of Credit and
Commerce International S.A. (In Liquidation) [1998] A.C. 20, 45–47)
relating to the mutual interaction of employer and employee, more
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particularly the ‘‘impact of the employer’s behaviour on the employee’’
(quoting D. Brodie ‘‘The Heart of the Matter: Mutual Trust and
Confidence’’ (1996) 25 I. L. J. 121, 121–22). The development of the
‘‘trust and confidence’’ idea in similar commercial sale situations is
potentially very significant, though not necessarily unwelcome. In any
event, the respondents’ refusal to provide such information entitled the
appellants to rescind the agreement, therefore allowing them to rescind
the contract of sale (at [38]).
While unanimous in implying a duty to disclose, their Lordships
omitted to state when such a duty subsisted. Lord Mance suggested
the duty to disclose might operate after inspection but before repair or,
alternatively, when offered to the buyer as repaired; however, he left
the point undecided (at [54]). It appears implicit in the other speeches
that the duty arose when the goods were offered as repaired. Given
that Lord Rodger identified an implied term in the agreement not to
rescind whilst the respondents performed, there is also an unanswered
question about the duty to disclose while the actual repair is in the
process of being carried out.
Therefore, the decision really rests upon the respondents having
behaved ‘‘thoroughly unreasonably’’ by not disclosing the nature of
the fault: at [41] (Lord Brown). It is not clear if the appellants could
have rejected the goods if the respondents had simply stated the nature
of the fault repaired. Given that the goods were repaired to a ‘‘factory
gate specification’’, it would seem that the buyer would not be able to
reject them. Somewhat frustratingly, by deciding the case on this
ground, the House of Lords has left such broader questions about the
interpretation of section 35 (6) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 for
another day.
DANIEL CARR
BONA FIDE IN THE INTEREST OF CERTAINTY
THE rule that a company may only exercise the power to amend its
articles of association ‘‘bona fide in the best interests of the company
as a whole’’ (Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd. [1900] 1 Ch. 656)
is neither ‘‘clear [n]or easy to apply’’; there are ‘‘no recent English
cases and the older ones [are] quite difficult’’ (per Christopher Nugee
Q.C. in Constable v. Executive Communications Ltd. [2005] 2 B.C.L.C.
638 at 652). Fortunately, and in the absence of new English authority,
greater clarity has been brought to the rule by the decision of the Privy
Council in Citco Banking Corporation NV v. Pusser’s Ltd. [2007]
UKPC 13.
500 The Cambridge Law Journal [2007]
